I refer to the letter Time ripe for Bar Council to boycott courts .

Aliran president P Ramakrishnan's recommendation for what is, in effect, industrial action by the Bar in objection to questionable judgements of the courts (particularly, in this instance, the Federal Court's interpretation of its own Rule 137) possesses a certain attraction for those, such as myself, who long ago tired of verbal protests of the wholly ineffective kind.

However, if this is to be a question of moral duty then this position must surely be invalided by an advocate's adherence to the same section 42(a) of the Legal Profession Act 1976, on which Ramakrishnan depends for his justification, namely that the Bar must ‘uphold the cause of justice without regard to its own interests or that of its members, uninfluenced by fear or favour.’

If by failing to appear in court an advocate jeopardises the position of his or her client, then the question of Ramakrishnan's principle must at least be overshadowed by a genuine doubt based on an equally compelling interpretation of the same principle.

In this regard, any forceful attempt, however noble its intention, to have the Federal Court revise its decision is by its own nature utterly undemocratic.

This does not deny, however, that court's decision is quite curious, to put it very charitably; but sadly this illustrates a real failure of the democratic process: to simplify, what happens when the majority determine legitimately that they should be ruled by a tyrant?

Likewise, what happens when a legitimately-constituted court abrogates a facet of its own democratic responsibility?

To preserve the rule of law we must depend on a remedy that originates from within the Federal Court itself, or from Parliament; but if neither shows any inclination to do such a thing, then we must at least consider the fact that the rule of law has, in this case, and only in this case, actively prevented the emergence of justice.

We must therefore seek our solace elsewhere.